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Abstract 
Recent perception research has revealed that judgments of distance are influenced by the 
energetic cost required to perform particular actions, such as walking, across these 
distances (Proffitt, 2006b).  However, this prior research has focused almost exclusively 
on the perceptual consequences of solo action, despite the fact that individuals regularly 
become embedded within social units for the purpose of joint action (Richardson, Marsh, 
& Schmidt, 2005). In two experiments, the current work sought to test the hypothesis that 
forming a social unit creates a new perception-action system with distinct perceptual 
attunement of the environment scaled to the unit’s action-potential. Participants, 
accompanied by a confederate, were asked to judge the distance between themselves and 
a target location after being told they would be carrying a heavy box to it either 
individually or jointly. Surprisingly, even though carrying with another person requires 
less physical effort, participants judged distances to be farther when they expected help, 
thus challenging the comprehensiveness of Proffitt’s (2006) energetic economy account. 
Instead, these findings are explained in terms of the constraints on unit coordination that 
result from both the task itself and from perceptions of one’s partner. 
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Distance Judgments for Joint Action: The Perceptual Consequences of Anticipated 
Coordination 
 All mental processes invariably take place within a biological body that moves 
and acts in an environment. The acknowledgment of this fact lies at the heart of recent 
approaches to understanding cognition that emphasize its situated and embodied nature 
(e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Clark, 1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Semin & Smith, 2008). 
Though these labels have been used for a widely diverse range of ideas and theories, a 
common unifying principle among them is the rejection of the traditional model of the 
mind as an abstract information processor of amodal, symbolic representations (e.g., 
Fodor, 1975; Newell, 1980). Despite the predominance of this conceptualization for the 
last half-century, research has begun to suggest that this classical theoretical approach has 
largely missed the mind’s primary adaptive function: to facilitate action. As Clark (1997, 
p. 1) notes, “We imagined minds as a kind of logical reasoning device coupled with a 
store of explicit data – a kind of logic machine and filing cabinet. In so doing, we ignored 
the fact that minds evolved to make things happen.”  
 The research to be described here takes as its starting point the basic premise that 
mental activity developed first and foremost so as to allow humans to better act within 
their immediate environment. This paper will begin by briefly describing the mounting 
evidence suggesting that cognition is tied directly to one’s physical, bodily state (i.e., it is 
embodied) as well as to the immediate context and environment (i.e., it is situated). It will 
then consider a particular mental activity, visual perception, through the lens of Gibson’s 
(1979) ecological approach, a perspective that similarly argues that modern day vision is 
the result of evolutionary adaptations reflecting the interplay between an organism’s 
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anatomy, its environment, and its way of life in that environment. Two visual adaptations 
are of particular relevance to the studies described below. First, perception of spatial 
layout is influenced by the anticipated energetic costs necessary to perform particular 
actions across that area. The management of one’s energetic output is known as the 
economy of action (Proffitt, 2006b). Secondly, the social environment in which humans 
evolved resulted in selection pressure to be able to accurately detect and utilize 
functional, social information (McArthur & Baron, 1983). Both of these adaptations will 
be discussed more fully before their implications are considered in an experimental 
situation where they necessarily intersect. 
Cognition as Embodied  
 To say that cognition is embodied simply means that states of the physical body 
play a central role in mental activity (Barsalou, 2003; Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & 
Ruppert, 2003). Research pointing to the close relationship between motor and cognitive 
processes has accumulated over the last three decades, the sum of which suggests a 
reciprocal dynamic. On the one hand, mental states produce automatic, unconscious 
changes in one’s bodily state. For example, Wiesfeld and Beresford (1982) found that 
receiving positive feedback on a test produced not just improved cognitive and affective 
states, but also a change in the receiver’s bodily state. Those receiving a high grade 
adopted a more erect posture than those receiving a lower grade. Importantly, more subtle 
perceptual cues also produce bodily reactions. Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996) 
famously found that participants’ walking speed from the laboratory to an elevator was 
slower if they completed a word task with items consistent with an elderly stereotype 
(e.g., “grey,” “Florida,” and “wrinkle”). Thus, the priming of a particular social group 
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produced an associated bodily response, an effect that has been demonstrated in several 
other related experiments (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2002; Dijksterhuis, Spears, & 
Lépinasse, 2001).  
 Cognitive appraisals of immoral behavior have also been linked to comparable 
reactions to physical contamination (Rozin, Haidt, & Fincher, 2009). Chapman, Kim, 
Susskind, and Anderson (2009) found that facial muscles related to disgust activate when 
individuals witness an unfair distribution of money. Similarly, threats to one’s own sense 
of moral purity produce a desire to cleanse physically. In Zhong and Liljenquist’s (2006) 
study, participants asked to recall previous unethical behavior were more likely to accept 
a free antiseptic wipe while exiting the laboratory than those who recalled a positive 
experience. Schaller (2006) has suggested that the behavioral immune system, a set of 
mechanisms adapted to allow individuals to detect the presence of parasites in objects 
and other people, evolved to be oversensitive to such cues and therefore likely to result in 
frequent false positives. Thus, this association between physical disgust and purely 
mental aversion can be understood as an adaptation for self-protection. 
 The effect mental processes have on physical ones is particularly evident in social 
contexts, as overt physical reactions are made in response to perceiving and interacting 
with social partners. Specifically, the bodily states of others often produce automatic and 
unconscious mimicry by the perceiver. Such effects in dyadic interactions have been 
found for yawning (Provine, 1986), rubbing one’s nose (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), and 
gesturing while speaking (Maxwell, Cook, & Burr, 1985). Interestingly, recent 
neuroscientific research suggests that certain brain regions are specialized for just such 
mimicry. These “mirror-neurons” have been shown to fire both when the perceivers 
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themselves act as well as when they simply observe others perform these same actions 
(Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Even when not 
mirroring per se, partners in social dyads often unintentionally coordinate their rhythmic 
behavior with one another. In Schmidt and O’Brien (1997) and Richardson, Marsh, and 
Schmidt (2005), participants asked to swing a wrist-pendulum at their own tempo 
nevertheless synchronized with co-actors. This same unintentional coordination has also 
been found in partners sitting in rocking chairs (Richardson, Marsh, Isenhower, 
Goodman, & Schmidt, 2007), an effect moderated by the visual information available 
about the partner. 
 In addition to the effects mental states have on the body, the embodied cognition 
perspective points to the bi-directionality of the relationship: one’s bodily state also 
produces changes in cognitive and affective states. Holding a particular posture, for 
example, acts as a trigger to a variety of mental responses. Duclos et al. (1989) found that 
when inducing subjects to hold postures associated with anger, sadness, and fear, 
participants actually reported feeling those respective emotions more strongly. Similarly, 
upright posture produces a greater sense of self-confidence (Riskind & Gotay, 1982) and 
pride (Stepper & Strack, 1993), an effect that can actually improve task performance. 
Embodiment effects influence evaluative judgments as well. Cacioppo, Priester, and 
Berntson (1993) suggested that certain arm motions relevant to approach/avoidance 
behavior have become coupled with particular affective states. On encountering desirable 
objects, individuals are more apt to use their arms to pull the object towards them, 
whereas undesirable objects would be pushed away. They tested this empirically by 
having participants who could not read Chinese view neutral Chinese ideographs while 
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either pushing upward (flexion/approach) or downward (extension/avoidance) on an 
exercise bar or table surface. As hypothesized, those images viewed during arm flexion 
were later rated more positively than those viewed during extension. Neumann and 
Strack (2000) used a similar experimental paradigm to show that response time is faster 
for classifying positively or negatively valenced words when participants are performing 
the congruently valenced arm movement. 
 Head movements are also coupled with evaluative cognitive states. Wells and 
Petty’s (1980) participants who were asked to nod their heads vertically were more likely 
to support a message they were listening to than those shaking their head horizontally. 
Tom, Pettersen, Lau, Burton, and Cooke (1991) replicated this study by inducing head 
shaking, only to then offer participants either a pen that was present during their 
movements or one that was not visible. Those nodding vertically were more apt to accept 
the pen that was visible whereas those who were shaking their head were more likely to 
take the new pen. Moreover, Förster and Strack (1996) found that vertical and horizontal 
head movements enhanced recognition memory for positive and negative words, 
respectively. This suggests that bodily actions influence both attitudes as well as actual 
cognitive performance. Numerous studies have also demonstrated that facial expressions 
produce complementary affective responses (Adelmann & Zajonc, 1987). For example, 
frowning increases aggression (Laird, 1974), smiling improves mood (Rhodewalt & 
Comer, 1979), and furrowing one’s brow increases the feeling of mental effort (Larsen, 
Kasimatis, & Frey, 1992). Again, these embodiment effects extend beyond just producing 
relevant affective states. Instead, higher level cognitive and evaluative processes are also 
influenced. Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) facilitated or inhibited the muscles 
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necessary for smiling by asking participants to hold a pen in their mouth while reading 
cartoons. Cartoons were rated as funnier when smiling was facilitated. 
 Ultimately, the findings made across these diverse research paradigms all point to 
the essential and necessary role the body plays in cognition. Because humans evolved 
from organisms whose mental activity was devoted to immediate, on-line perception and 
action, present-day cognition should be understood as being strongly tied to and 
influenced by these basic sensorimotor processes. As a result, even presumed high-level 
cognitive abilities, such as language (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and moral reasoning 
(Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008), are grounded in the physical reality of one’s body. 
Thus, in order to understand what is taking place in the head, one must consider what is 
taking place in the body on which it is located. 
Cognition as Situated 
 Just as cognition necessarily takes place within a body, this body is itself 
necessarily located within a physical, social, and temporal context. To say that cognition 
is situated means that there is interdependence between the person and this immediate 
context, and therefore cognitive activity is best understood as arising from the 
relationship between the individual and this socio-physical setting (Clark, 1997; Smith & 
Semin, 2004; 2007). Recent theorizing has pointed out the limitations found in traditional 
dualistic conceptions of the organism-environment relationship, in which the organism is 
generally viewed as an active agent and the environment merely the background 
supporting its actions (Järvilehto, 2009). In contrast to this, the theory of the organism-
environment system suggests that an organism and its environment are ultimately 
inseparable, forming one unitary system (Järvilehto, 1998; Lewontin, 1991). As 
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Järvilehto (1998) notes, “The organism cannot exist without the environment and the 
environment has descriptive properties only if it is connected to the organism” (p. 329).  
 Viewing individuals as radically embedded (Marsh, Johnston, Richardson, & 
Schmidt, 2009) in this way requires reconceptualizing traditional approaches to 
understanding many types of cognitive phenomena. For example, attitudes have long 
been viewed as stable, dispositional mental constructs: “a psychological tendency that is 
expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly 
& Chaiken, 1993, p. 1). However, people’s actual explicit reports of these attitudes are 
extremely malleable, highly sensitive to current social situations, and only weakly 
predictive of actual behavior (Wicker, 1969). Defending this traditional view of latent 
attitudes, Eagly and Chaiken (2005) argue that this observed variability merely highlights 
the variability of attitude reporting, not the nature of the mental construct itself. Thus, 
context sensitivity is seen merely as noise preventing the study of presumed invariant 
representations. In contrast, a situated approach to cognition views this variance as a sign 
of the mutuality of the person and the socio-physical environment, thereby making 
context sensitivity not a barrier to understanding attitudes, but a central component of all 
evaluative processes (Schwarz, 2007; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001). The situated perspective 
is supported by the failure of implicit attitudinal measures to provide evidence for more 
stable constructs, a method once thought to provide a clear means of avoiding strategic 
responding and contextual consideration. Instead, implicit attitudes are similarly 
dependent on the physical, social, and temporal context (Blair, 2002). For example, 
Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park (2001) found that Black face primes produced more negative 
automatic responses when shown in an urban setting relative to a church setting. 
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Additionally, both the immediate goals (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004) and current 
physiological state (Seibt, Häfner, & Deutsch, 2007) of the individual have been shown 
to impact these implicit measures. Thus, even implicitly measured attitudes appear 
designed to facilitate action within a given context. 
 In much the same way, the activation of stereotypes, traditionally conceived of as 
stable schematic knowledge structures, has been shown to be a process highly sensitive to 
the local context and goals of the perceiver (Smith & Semin, 2007). For example, 
receiving praise from an African American physician activates positive stereotypes 
related to doctors, whereas receiving criticism from this person triggers the activation of 
negative race-based stereotypes (Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). Importantly, this difference 
does not occur when the perceiver observes the target praising or criticizing someone 
else. Thus, the effect appears to arise because of the participants’ motivation to believe 
praise and disregard criticism.  
 In addition to cognitive processes performed on-line, memory is also a mental 
capacity that is inherently situated (Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). The environment in which 
people learn information influences their ability to remember it, with recall better if in the 
original location it was learned (Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). 
The ability to remember specific objects is also in part dependent on the setting where 
that object is located. For example, Mandler and Stein (1974) had children view a set of 
objects arranged as they would be in a real-world scene (e.g., furniture in a room) or 
arranged randomly. Recall was found to be superior when objects were in meaningfully 
organized sets. Similar effects are found for auditory word recognition, with words heard 
in sentences more accurately identified than those heard in isolation (Miller & Isard, 
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1963). Consistent with this basic premise that memory operates with a dependence on 
contextual meaning, Biederman (1981) proposed a situated theory of scene processing 
that argues that the ease of recalling and identifying an object is dependent on the 
appropriateness of its position in the scene. In support of this argument, Bar and Ullman 
(1996) found that identification speed was faster when objects were shown in the correct 
relative position (e.g., hat above a leg) than for in incorrect positions (e.g., leg above a 
hat). This evidence suggests that mental concepts are not abstract schemata pulled from 
situations; rather, they are situated phenomena. 
 From an evolutionary perspective, the context dependency of these cognitive 
processes should not be surprising. Cognition developed so as to facilitate behavior, so its 
adaptive benefit is based primarily on its functionality in the immediate context. Thus, 
cognitive processes are an asset specifically because they are highly sensitive to the 
specifics of the current situation, are influenced by the actor’s current motivations, and 
overweight recent experience at the expense of more distant experience (Schwarz, 2007). 
These findings serve to point out the fact that what takes place in the head can only be 
understood in light of the physical, social, and temporal location in which the entire 
person is situated. 
The Ecological Approach to Perception 
 The key principle unifying the situated and embodied approaches to cognition 
described above is the emphasis placed on action. The chief priority for any organism is 
to successfully function within its given environment, and so evolutionary pressures will 
have favored the natural adaptations that best facilitated functional behavior. The 
research reviewed thus far demonstrates these effects on cognition, but visual perception 
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is another product of these same evolutionary pressures. The earliest appearance of visual 
organs some 530 million years ago came about in the transition between small, slow 
Precambrian organisms and the more mobile creatures of the Cambrian explosion (Land 
& Nilsson, 2002). The former fauna, worm-like animals which crawled along the surface 
of the seafloors, had little need for fully developed spatial vision. However, as these 
organisms became larger and increasingly ambulatory, selection came to favor those 
organisms that could most effectively navigate and adapt to their environments (Land & 
Nilsson, 2002). Perception, then, developed specifically so as to allow these organisms to 
better traverse and act within their particular ecological niches. 
 As with these earliest animals, modern day vision for human eyes reflects this 
relationship between the organism’s anatomy, its environment, and its behavior within 
this environment. Gibson’s (1979) ecological approach to perception has provided a 
theoretical framework that accounts for this animal-environment reciprocity by tying 
perception directly to action. As a result, this account is inherently embodied and 
situated. Gibson’s (1979) definition of perception clearly highlights these components: 
Perception is “to be aware of the surfaces of the environment and of oneself in it” (p. 
255). It is a situated approach in that vision is argued to involve not merely sensations 
experienced from isolated stimuli, but instead it is an awareness of an entire environment 
resulting from being within an ambient optic array consisting of multiple sources of light 
and reflecting surfaces. People do not experience empty space; rather, vision is 
necessarily grounded to invariant frames of reference, such as the horizon, which are 
provided by the environment in which we inhabit (Gibson, 1950). Moreover, perception 
is embodied because awareness of this environment is necessarily dependent on an active 
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perceiver moving within this ambient optic array. As Gibson (1947, 1950) famously 
discovered with his studies on aircraft landing, permitting observers to move makes many 
of the supposed problems of spatial perception disappear. Moving one’s eyes, head, or 
feet alters the structure of the optic array, all while the person’s body acts as an invariant 
across these changes. It is through the combination of both variants and invariants that 
knowledge about the world comes about. 
 Thus, according to the ecological approach, perception is inherently an activity 
involving the picking up of information about one’s environment in relation to one’s 
body (Mace, 1986). One of the key principles emerging out of this perspective is the 
concept of affordances. Gibson (1979) defined the affordances of an environment as 
“what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (p. 127). 
This concept seeks to account for the fact that perception involves not only the 
discernment of the structure of the objects in one’s surroundings, but also an awareness 
of the functional opportunities for action provided by these objects. For example, one 
perceives both an apple’s structural properties (e.g., red and spherical) as well as its 
functional properties (e.g., graspable, edible, throwable). These functional properties are 
not subjective projections from the perceiver onto the world, nor are they inherent 
properties of the objects. Rather, they exist as a result of the relationship between the 
perceiver and the target. Steps are perceived to be climbable (Warren, 1984), seats “sit-
onable” (Mark, 1987), and doorways passable (Warren & Whang, 1987) only when both 
the physiology of the perceiver and the physical characteristics of the target allow for 
such an action.  
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 The ability to detect such affordances reflects the functionally adaptive nature of 
perception itself. Vision is attuned to this action-oriented information because it is only 
through an awareness of the environment’s possibilities that organisms are actually able 
to survive within them. A comprehensive understanding of present-day visual perception 
therefore requires consideration of the different non-optical factors that would have 
influenced its evolutionary development. Two such factors influencing the ability of 
humans, as perceiving organisms, to successfully act in their environments will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
The Economy of Action 
 One key capacity necessary for evolutionary survival is the ability to effectively 
manage energy expenditure (Proffitt, 2006b). That is, energy consumption must be 
greater than energy output. For example, a predator cannot expend more energy chasing 
its prey than it would acquire by eating it. The degree to which an organism effectively 
manages this economy of action has significant implications on its survival.  
 Proffitt (2006a, 2006b) has argued that the economy of action is a principal law of 
survival and, as such, has played a formative role in the development of visual 
perception. Consistent with Gibson’s (1979) position that perception is for the facilitation 
of action, this view of perception is functional. Growing out of adaptive pressures, 
perception of the spatial layout of one’s environment is the product of not only optical 
information but also the perceiver’s potential to act on that environment. As a result, 
affordances can be understood not only in terms of the perceiver’s functional relationship 
with specific objects, but also in terms of the perceiver’s relationship with the entirety of 
the environmental space. In other words, how one perceives his or her surroundings is 
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influenced by the energetic costs associated with performing particular actions across it, 
such as walking.  
 Research conducted over the last two decades has found support for 
conceptualizing perception in utilitarian terms. For example, judgments of hill slant, 
measured with both verbal assessments and with visual matching tasks, have been found 
to be grossly overestimated: 5° hills are judged to be about 20° and 10° hills judged to be 
about 30° (Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995). These “errors” are actually 
useful, as perception is distorted for the purpose of more effectively guiding locomotion 
through the environment. Importantly, slant judgments have been found to conform to 
ratio scales, meaning that people show higher sensitivity to incremental changes in 
smaller slants than they do to larger ones. Because environmental awareness informs the 
selection of planned action, heightened sensitivity to small differences in smaller slants 
has a great deal of utility (Proffitt, 2006b). Walking up a 7° hill requires considerably 
more effort than walking up a 3° hill, and perceptual awareness of this difference will 
have an impact on how one chooses to traverse it (e.g., speed of locomotion, bipedal 
walking or quadrupedal climbing). Attunement to the difference between a 77° and a 73° 
incline, on the other hand, has little or no behavioral significance.  
 Moreover, these judgments of slants have been found to be influenced by the 
particular physiological potential of the perceiver. Fatigued participants, asked to run for 
one hour in between slant judgments, perceived hills to be much steeper than they did 
prior to running (Proffitt et al., 1995). Physical fitness was also found to be negatively 
correlated with perceived hill steepness (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). Similar results were 
found among a sample of elderly adults, with verbal and visual measures of slant 
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positively correlated with age and declining health (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). 
Manipulating anticipated effort by having participants wear a heavy backpack also had 
perceptual implications, with those heavily encumbered judging hills to be steeper than 
those not (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999).  
 In addition to judgments of slant, perceptions of distance have likewise been 
found to be influenced by the effortful costs associated with performing a particular 
action across that distance. Distance judgments are overestimated when looking either 
uphill or downhill compared to across flat terrains (Stefanucci, Proffitt, Banton, & 
Epstein, 2005). Participants expecting to walk to various targets judged these objects to 
be farther away while wearing a heavy backpack (Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton & Epstein, 
2003), and chronic pain patients have been shown to similarly perceive target distances to 
be greater than control groups (Witt et al., 2008). Consistent results have also been found 
for tasks unrelated to walking. For example, participants asked to throw a heavy ball 
judged their distance from the target to be greater than those throwing a lighter ball (Witt, 
Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004).  
 This relationship between energy expenditure and perceptual outcomes is a 
learned one. That is, the anticipated optic flow experienced while walking is associated 
with the effort typically expended to produce this rate of optic flow, and several studies 
have been able to temporarily alter this relationship. Reiser, Pick, Asmead, and Garing 
(1995), for example, had participants walk on a treadmill that was being pulled by a 
tractor, with the treadmill set to speeds incongruent with the participants’ expected speed 
based on expended walking energy. This mismatch produced an after-effort when 
participants were next asked to walk blindfolded to a target. Those whose adjusted optic 
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flow was faster than the normal rate of walking undershot the targets, while those whose 
optic flow rate was slower overshot the targets. In related research, Anstis (1995) found 
that after participants ran on a treadmill while blindfolded (and thus experienced zero 
optic flow), they would drift forward when asked to jog in place with their eyes closed. 
Additionally, creating this mismatch between energy expenditure and perceptual outcome 
has been shown to affect verbal distance judgments. Proffitt et al. (2003) had participants 
wear virtual reality goggles, which provided either zero optic flow or appropriate optic 
flow while walking on a treadmill. Those experiencing no optic flow while walking came 
to associate some energy expenditure with going nowhere. As a result, distance estimates 
following this exercise were greater than for those trained with congruent optic flow.  
 Importantly, the effects of effort on perception appear to be action-specific (Witt, 
Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004). That is, effort’s influence on perceived distance is dependent 
upon the perceiver’s intended action. Altering anticipated optic flow rate by walking on a 
treadmill influences the apparent distance to an object when the participant anticipates 
walking to it. However, if the intention is to throw an object to that target, apparent 
distance is unaffected. In the same way, throwing a heavy ball to a target influences 
perceived distance when participants expect to throw again, but not if they expect to walk 
to it (Witt et al., 2004). This is consistent with Heft’s (1989) treatment of affordances as 
necessarily involving the intentions of the perceiver. Whether an object affords grasping, 
for example, requires assessment relative to the intentional act, not merely the scaling of 
one’s body to the environment. Similarly, the influence of anticipated effort on 
perceptions of the environment is moderated by how the perceiver intends to act across 
this environment. 
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 These studies all support the position that one’s perception of the world is a 
function of not only optical information, but it is also influenced by one’s potential for 
action in it (i.e., what the environment affords the perceiver), the purposeful intentions of 
the perceiver, and the effortful costs associated with these actions.  
The Detection of Social Affordances 
The key premise of the ecological approach is that perception serves an adaptive 
function for the organism (Heft, 2001; Reed, 1996). Because of this, the external world 
must provide the perceiver with information that successfully guides functional behavior. 
Though the emphasis of the field has primarily been on how people pick up on the action 
possibilities that inanimate objects afford, the environments in which humans belong are 
inherently social. Physical and socio-cultural factors are intertwined and experienced 
concurrently (Heft, 2007). As Gibson (1979) himself noted, other people are for humans 
the “richest and most elaborate affordances of the environment” (p. 135). In light of this, 
humans’ evolutionary history implies the ability to successfully perceive social 
affordances, or the functional meaning found in interactions with other people.  
 Baron (1980, 1981; McArthur & Baron, 1983) first introduced the ecological 
perspective to social psychology, proposing that social perception – the act of perceiving 
traits and attributes in others – can be conceptualized as detecting veridical, functional 
information about how to interact with the target. For example, observing that someone is 
smiling and friendly to the perceiver suggests that particular interactions are available 
that would not exist if the individual were frowning. Conceptualizing psychological 
attributes (i.e., personality traits) as affordances, researchers have since attempted to find 
whether individual characteristics could be perceived directly without requiring 
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inferential processes (e.g., Zebrowitz, 2006; Zebrowitz & Collins, 1997). Such social 
invariants, just like the physical invariants of objects, should be available for detection 
and functional application by all members of the species. Research has found some 
support for social consensus on traits that are particularly relational, such as extroversion 
(Kenny, 1994) and sexual availability (Gangestad, Simpson, DiGeronimo, & Biek, 1992). 
Additionally, use of point-light videos has demonstrated how movement provides 
kinematic information that specifies particular attributes, such as gender (Cutting & 
Kozlowski, 1979; Runeson & Frykholm, 1983), deceptive behavior (Runeson & 
Frykholm, 1983), carefulness (Hodges & Lindheim, 2006), and even vulnerability to 
mugging (Gunns, Johnston, & Hudson, 2002).  
 Being able to recognize what another person offers a perceiver requires the 
capacity to detect the opportunities for action this person has. Therefore, perceiving the 
affordances for others in their environments would be another crucial adaptive capacity 
for humans. In support of this, individuals have been shown to be able to detect the 
critical boundaries for particular actions not only for themselves but also for others, such 
as the maximum height one can sit on a surface (Stoffregen, Gorday, Sheng & Flynn, 
1999), whether an object is reachable (Ramenzoni, Riley, Davis, & Snyder, 2005), and 
whether a gap can be crossed (Mark, 2007). This research suggests that perceivers are 
capable of alternating from an egocentric perspective to an allocentric perspective when 
making judgments about others’ capabilities. Judgments of others’ action potentials are 
therefore based not on one’s own physiological capabilities, but on those detected in the 
target.  
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 Being able to detect veridical information about others (McArthur & Baron, 1983) 
and their potential for action in the environment (e.g., Stoffregen et al., 1999) is useful 
chiefly because this information allows for successful interaction. Importantly, more than 
just being aware of one another, humans cooperate and co-act. Individuals acting together 
form a social synergy (Marsh, Richardson, Baron, & Schmidt, 2006), a wholly new 
perception-action system that is distinct from the mere individuals constituting it. As a 
result, the presence of another person provides new possibilities for joint-action within 
their shared environment. For example, a high wall may afford little to a lone individual, 
but, if provided with a partner, the pair’s possible coordinated behavior may now make 
the wall afford climbing.  
Once a part of a social synergy, individuals have been shown to detect 
opportunities for joint action following laws similar to how one detects intrapersonal 
affordances. For example, Richardson, Marsh, and Baron (2007) found that transitioning 
from using one hand, two hands, a tool, and working cooperatively with a partner when 
moving wooden planks of varying sizes followed the same, lawful patterns. The 
emergence of joint activity resulted from the relationship between the actors’ particular 
physiologies (i.e., hand and arm length) and the object (i.e., plank length). Moreover, 
these affordances for cooperation come about in relation to the fit between the actors’ 
shared capabilities, such as matching or mismatched arm length, as well as the strength of 
the contextual pull to work in concert (Isenhower, Richardson, Carello, Baron, & Marsh, 
2010). Thus, there is evidence that individuals are able to perceive interpersonal 
affordances as part of a social unit in much the same way intrapersonal affordances are 
detected when acting alone.  
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The Effortful Implications of Joint Action on Spatial Perception 
In sum, cognition necessarily involves an awareness of one’s body and one’s 
current physical, social, and temporal environment. For humans, this awareness comes 
about in large part through visual perception, which, according to the ecological 
approach, is attuned to functional information about how one can act in this environment. 
This attunement is the result of evolutionary pressures favoring those adaptations that 
allowed for successful survival within the organisms’ particular ecological niche. 
The goal of the current research was to test the implications of the two particular 
perceptual attunements outlined above – the influence effort has on distance perception 
and the ability to accurately detect social affordances as part of a synergy – in a situation 
in which they overlap: carrying an object either with or without a partner. Though prior 
research has shown that judgments of distance are influenced by the observer’s purposes 
and the behavioral abilities of the observer’s body, the experiments reported here sought 
to see whether this holds true not only when individuals act alone, but also when they 
take part in joint-action with a partner. By forming a social unit, two individuals become 
a new perception-action system. Just as this system has new environmental affordances 
available to the unit, it should also have its own energetic economy to which its members 
are attuned. Thus, this research was interested in exploring whether the perceptual 
consequences of anticipated effort previously demonstrated for solo behavior follow a 
similar pattern when individuals are part of a dyadic unit.  
In the following experiments, participants were asked to judge the distance 
between themselves and a target location when expecting to carry a heavy object either 
with or without a partner who affords helping. With another person present to share a 
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portion of the load, anticipated physical, energetic costs should be lower among those in 
the joint carrying condition. In light of the prior literature demonstrating the costs of 
required energetic expenditure on perceived distance, it was hypothesized that 
participants’ ability to detect the possibility for and implications of joint action afforded 
by their partner would lead to the perception of smaller distances relative to those 
expecting to carry alone.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-three University of Connecticut undergraduate students (17 
male, 16 female) participated in the experiment. Participants were recruited as part of a 
requirement for their introductory course. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
and were without any physical impairment that would hinder their ability to lift objects. 
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiment was conducted in a basketball gym, 
which contained a tarp covering about half the court. The tarp’s dimensions were 7.62 m 
x 14.94 m (≈ 25 ft x 49 ft). Thread was sewn into the tarp at distances of 4 m, 6 m, 8 m, 
10 m, and 12 m from a set point along five rows, placed flush to the ground so they were 
unobservable to the participant (see Figure 1). An orange cone was placed on one of the 
21 locations for each trial.  
The box being lifted by participants was made of cardboard and had hand-slits on 
either side. Its dimensions were 61 cm x 45.72 cm x 30.48 cm (≈ 24” x 18” x 12”). The 
box was weighted to be approximately 25% of the participant’s reported weight, acquired 
prior to the experiment during participant pre-screening. Five pound weights were used to 
incrementally weight the box. For each participant, insulation foam was placed on the 
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bottom of the box and five weights were placed on top (one in each corner, one in the 
center). Another layer of insulation foam was then placed on top of these, and any 
additional weights were placed on this layer. A final, third layer of insulation foam was 
then placed on top. Construction goggles were covered with black duct tape to serve as 
the blind-fold. 
A questionnaire filled out at the completion of the study asked participants to rate 
the confederate on physical and interpersonal characteristics using Likert-type 9-point 
scales. Though carrying a heavy object with another person is inherently less physically 
difficult than carrying alone, variation in anticipated difficulty within groups were 
hypothesized to result from differing judgments of how useful one’s partner would 
actually be. Thus, the purpose of these impression measures was to gauge whether the 
degree to which one views the confederate as a helpful and welcome aid in carrying the 
box would impact distance estimates among those in the joint condition. Perceptions of 
the confederate’s physical characteristics were assessed with two items: strength and 
athleticism. Interpersonal characteristics were assessed with three items: how much they 
liked the confederate, how much interaction they had with the confederate, and how 
similar to themselves they thought the confederate was. Additionally, the final item asked 
participants how accurate they thought their judgments of distance were. 
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to either the solo-carrying or the 
joint-carrying condition. Each participant was presented with five trials at distances of 4 
m, 6 m, 8 m, 10 m, and 12 m, consistent with those used by Proffitt et al. (2003). The five 
distances and rows were presented in a randomized order. On each trial, two dependent 
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measures of judged distance were taken: the participant first provided a verbal estimate of 
distance in feet and then blind-walked to the target. 
Procedure. Participants volunteered to participate in a study called “object 
carrying across environments.” They arrived at the gym and were met by a same-sex 
confederate acting as another participant. In the solo-carrying condition, they were told 
that they would be taking turns carrying a heavy box to different locations on the tarp. In 
the joint-carrying condition, participants were told that they would be working together to 
carry the box to each location. However, both groups were told that before they actually 
carry the box, the experimenter would first have them estimate how far they thought the 
target locations were to which they would be carrying. 
The participant was brought to stand at the convergence point of five rows of 
distances (see Fig. 1) and picked up the box. They were then asked to turn while the 
experimenter placed a cone in one of the five set distances. The participant then turned, 
was shown a yard stick as a scale reference, and was asked to estimate in feet and inches 
the distance they would be carrying to that cone while holding the box. The experimenter 
then told the participant that before they carry the weight, they will be asked to walk that 
distance without it. The participant then put on the blackened goggles and tried to walk to 
the cone (without the weight). Their stopping location was marked, and the participant 
was guided back to the starting location. So as to allow the participant on opportunity to 
get used to the procedure and reduce the variability of estimates, participants were first 
given two practice trials, consistent with past research (e.g., Proffitt et al., 2003). Practice 
trials were made at distances of 5 m and 9 m. These were completed without holding the 
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box, and the participant received feedback on their accuracy on each. On the five critical 
trials, participants received neither visual nor verbal feedback on their accuracy. 
After the five trials were completed, participants were given the questionnaire to 
fill out while the confederate ostensibly began the procedure for the distance estimates. 
Once the questionnaire was completed, the experimenter informed the participant that 
they would not actually be carrying the box, ended the study, and debriefed the 
participant. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the primary dependent measures of 
verbal and behavioral estimates of distance are presented in Table 1. Consistent with 
prior research (Loomis, da Silva, Fujita, & Fukusima, 1992; Loomis, da Silva, Philbeck, 
& Fukusima, 1996), participants in both groups generally underestimated distance to the 
target. However, participants tended to slightly overestimate their verbal estimate in the 
farthest trial. Importantly, participants demonstrated the ability to detect the variations in 
distance across the five trials. Correlations between the actual trial distance and each 
participant’s verbal and behavioral estimates indicated an extremely high range for both 
conditions, with participant r’s all above .90 and often approaching 1.00. Correlations 
between verbal and blind-walking estimates indicate that the two measures were 
significantly related for the farthest three trials (rs ≥ .47, ps < .01), but largely unrelated 
for the 4 m and 6 m trials (r = .15 and .16, respectively). 
To test the hypothesis that expectations regarding solo versus joint action would 
affect perceived distance, separate MANOVAs for verbal estimates and blind-walking 
distances were conducted. Condition was the between-subjects factor and trail distance 
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was the repeated measure. Not surprisingly, variance increased as the trial length 
increased; thus, Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been 
violated on both measures (Verbal: χ²(9)= 46.88, p <.001; Blind-walking: χ²(9) = 47.34, p 
< .001), therefore justifying the use of MANOVA instead of a repeated measures 
ANOVA.  For the verbal estimate, a significant within-subjects main effect was found for 
trial distance, F(4, 28) = 177.01, p < .001, again demonstrating participants’ capacity to 
distinguish the varying lengths used across the five trials. However, the main effect for 
condition was nonsignificant, F(1, 31) < 1. Moreover, no interaction was found between 
condition and trial distance, F(4, 28) = 1.41, p = .26. For the blind-walking measure, a 
significant within-subjects main effect was again found for trial distance, F(4, 28) = 
278.77, p < .001. As in the verbal measure, however, no effect for condition on blind-
walking was found, F(1, 31) < 1. The interaction between condition and trial distance 
was also not significant, F(4, 28) = 2.02, p = .12. 
As discussed earlier, the object participants anticipated carrying was a box sized 
to be approximately 25% of their weight, using five pound increments. This method was 
used chiefly so as to be roughly equivalent to the procedure used in prior work (e.g., 
Proffitt et al., 2003). However, as an inexact measure of participant strength, it was 
unclear whether this linear proportioning would actually ensure an equivalent experience 
of heaviness across participants of various sizes. Therefore, to check for the possibility 
that the weight of the box itself affected distance judgments, further analyses were 
conducted including box weight as a covariate across both verbal and blind-walking 
estimates using a linear mixed-effects model. Condition (solo carrying = 0, joint carrying 
= 1), type of estimate (verbal = 1, blind-walking = -1), box weight (centered on grand 
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mean), and trial distance (centered on 8 m) were entered first as main effects, and all two-
way, three-way, and four-way interactions were added in second, third, and fourth 
successive blocks, respectively (see Table 2 for estimates at each block). A significant 
main effect was found for type of estimate, t(32) = 3.71, p < .01, with verbal estimates 
larger than blind-walking distances. The main effect was not statistically significant for 
condition, t(30) < 1, or for box weight, t(30) = 1.38, p = .18. However, a significant 
interaction was found between trial distance and box weight, t(129) = 3.77, p < .001, with 
greater box weight predictive of larger distance estimates for the farthest trial, but not for 
shorter ones. The interaction between trial distance and type of estimate was also 
significant, t(131) = 9.68, p < .001, indicating that verbal estimates were greater than 
blind-walking distances on the largest trials, but not for shorter ones. Although none of 
the three-way interactions were significant, a significant four-way interaction was found, 
t(128) = -2.33, p < .05, indicating that box weight had the strongest positive effect on 
verbal estimates on the largest trials for those in the solo condition. Significant random 
effects were found for verbal estimates, Wald’s Z = 2.50, p < .05, and blind-walking, 
Wald Z = 2.67, p < .01, indicating significant variability among participants in their 
estimates. Surprisingly, the correlation between these two effects was not statistically 
significant, Wald Z = 1.56, p = .12. 
Perceptions of the confederate. Exploratory analyses of participants’ perceptions 
of the confederate were also conducted. Participants in the two conditions had similar 
impressions of the confederate, all |t|s ≤ 1.50, ps > .14. The confederate was generally 
rated above the midpoint in terms of strength (M = 6.03, SD = 1.09), athleticism (M = 
6.39, SD = 1.17), and being likable (M = 6.66, SD = 1.45). Confederates were rated at 
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about the midpoint for similarity (M = 4.87, SD = 1.68). Participants generally did not 
believe there was much interaction between themselves and the confederate (M = 3.31, 
SD = 2.09). Interestingly, though participants always rated a same-sex confederate, both 
genders were rated equivalently in terms of strength, athleticism, and likability, all |t|s ≤ 
1.27, ps > .21. However, the female confederate was rated higher in similarity by female 
participants than the male confederate was by male participants, t(30) = 2.21, p < .05 
(Women: M = 5.53, SD = 1.35; Men: M = 4.29, SD = 1.75). 
As would be expected, ratings of confederate strength and athleticism were highly 
correlated, r = .63, p < .01. Rating of similarity was correlated with amount of 
interaction, r = .54, p < .01, and liking, r = .56, p < .01, and liking and amount of 
interaction were also significantly correlated, r = .37, p < .05. Surprisingly, ratings of 
athleticism were also correlated with similarity, r = .48, p < .01, and liking, r = .37, p < 
.05. Correlations within conditions were also examined to determine if anticipating joint 
action would lead to stronger associations amongst impressions. One difference in 
correlation patterns was found. For those expecting to carry with the confederate, ratings 
of similarity were correlated with both perceived strength, r = .56, p < .05, and 
athleticism, r = .73, p < .01. In contrast, there was no such relationship in the solo 
condition (rs = -.07 and -.02, ps > .05), suggesting that those expecting to work with the 
confederate associated similarity at least in part with physical similarity, whereas those 
expecting to work alone did not. 
Analysis of first verbal trial. One possible reason for the lack of main effect for 
condition on either of the dependent variables was the length of the procedure. That is, 
though participants were instructed that they would eventually be carrying to these 
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locations, participants would naturally have become aware that their next, immediate 
action in either condition would be to simply walk to the cone. It was therefore possible 
that the manipulation of carrying alone or jointly lacked salience as the experiment 
proceeded. Therefore, it seemed advisable to look specifically at participants’ first verbal 
trial, which would be when the anticipation of carrying would presumably be most 
pronounced.  
Additionally, an analysis of this dependent variable allows for an exploration of 
the possible moderating role that perceptions of the confederate may have had on these 
distance estimates. Although the conditions did not differ in terms of how participants 
rated the confederate, the ratings themselves may differ in importance depending on the 
condition the participant is in. For those expecting to work with the confederate, this 
other person’s characteristics will be much more relevant, for it will directly alter the 
difficulty of the task. In contrast, for those not expecting to carry with the confederate, 
this person’s perceived traits are unrelated to the participants’ ability to complete the task. 
One would expect that perceptions of the confederate’s strength and athleticism, as 
physical characteristics, would be particularly important, as they would have a direct role 
in the anticipated energetic costs required for joint carrying. In light of this, partial 
correlations between these variables and verbal estimates of the first trial were explored, 
controlling for the actual distance of the first trial (see Table 3). Though athleticism was 
unrelated to the distance estimate among joint carriers (pr = .15, p > .05), a significant 
correlation was found for strength judgments. Interestingly, perceived strength was 
significantly correlated with the first verbal trial for those in the joint carrying condition, 
pr = .62, p < .05, but not for those in the solo condition, pr = .18, p =.56. Surprisingly, the 
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direction of this correlation indicates that the stronger participants believed their carrying 
partner to be, the larger was their distance estimate. 
To estimate the role perceptions of partner strength uniquely contributed to 
distance estimates, a three-step hierarchical regression analysis was conducted, using the 
participants’ first verbal trial as the dependent variable. In the first step, the actual 
distance of the first trial was entered. On the second step, the condition (solo carrying = 
0, joint carrying = 1) and confederate strength ratings (centered on grand mean) were 
entered. Finally, on the third step, the interaction between condition and perceived 
strength was included. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4. Not surprisingly, 
the actual distance of the first trial explained the vast bulk of the variance (R2 = .92). 
Condition and perceived strength were both positively related to distance estimates, with 
the latter being a statistically significant predictor, β = .12, t(28) = 2.33, p < .05. 
However, this main effect was qualified by a statistically significant interaction, as 
including the condition by perceived partner strength interaction in the third step also 
produced a significant change in the model’s explained variance, ∆R = .01, F(1, 27) = 
4.63, p < .05. This interaction was statistically significant, β = .16, t(27) = 2.15, p < .05. 
The simple slopes of this interaction can be seen in Figure 2. Estimated values for 
participants one standard deviation above and below the mean on perceived partner 
strength are graphed. It shows that the effect of perceived partner strength is exclusive to 
those in the joint carrying condition; that is, those expecting to actually carry the object 
with this person (bjoint = .62; bsolo < .01). Again, surprisingly, participants in the joint-
carrying condition reported their first distance to be farther when they judged the 
confederate to be stronger.  
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Discussion 
 Based on the previous work of Proffitt and colleagues (Proffitt et al., 2003; Witt et 
al., 2008), it was expected that participants who anticipated having to perform a more 
strenuous task would judge the distance this task would be done over to be larger. 
Because of this, those expecting to carry a heavy box with a partner were predicted to 
perceive their distance to the target locations to be shorter than those expecting to carry 
this same weight alone. However, the results of the experiment failed to support this 
hypothesis. Over five trials, participants did not differ across conditions in either verbal 
estimates or in blind-walking distances.  
 Do these results call into question the impact effort has on spatial perception? If 
they do, they would not be alone in doing so. The claims made by Proffitt (2006b) about 
the role anticipated energetic costs play on distance perception have been challenged by 
several researchers. For example, Hutchinson and Loomis (2006) sought to replicate 
Experiment 1 of Proffitt et al. (2003), wherein participants wore heavy backpacks and 
reported egocentric distance to various target locations. In the original study, those 
wearing a backpack reported distances to be farther than those unencumbered. In 
contrast, Hutchinson and Loomis (2006) failed to find any differences resulting from the 
backpack manipulation, using both between and within-subject designs and measuring 
verbal estimates, indirect blind-walking, and target size as the critical dependent 
variables.  
 Woods, Philbeck, and Danoff (2009) also report a series of experiments failing to 
find results consistent with an economy of action prediction. Closely replicating the 
procedure of Proffitt et al. (2003), they too found no difference in verbal distance 
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estimates resulting from wearing a backpack. Additionally, over three studies they sought 
to repeat the findings reported in Witt et al. (2004), who found that distance estimates 
were larger after participants threw a heavy ball than after they threw a lighter ball. 
Again, Woods et al. (2009) failed to find a difference by condition. However, in a fifth 
experiment, the authors found that explicitly instructing participants to focus on non-
visual factors did lead to larger estimates for those in the more effortful condition. They 
therefore suggest that the results finding support for the influence of energetic costs are 
not due to actual perceptual differences, but rather post-perceptual response bias. Durgin 
et al. (2009) make a similar claim, arguing that the differences found by manipulating 
anticipated effort are merely the result of the differing social demands of the 
experimental context, not the actual manipulation. In their experiment, they sought to test 
the findings of Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) by varying the apparent demand characteristics 
that result from being asked to wear a backpack. Participants judged the slant of a ramp 
either without a backpack, while wearing a backpack, or while wearing the backpack 
after being told it contained electromyographic (EMG) equipment meant to measure 
muscle strain. Participants wearing the backpack without being given this back-story 
gave larger slant estimates, whereas those in the EMG condition did not differ from the 
control. The authors argue that participants who are naïve to the experimenter’s 
hypothesis that energy impacts spatial perception will not be affected by energetic 
manipulations. 
 Proffitt and colleagues (Proffitt, 2009; Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 
2006) have responded to these critiques. They argue that methodological and theoretical 
limitations explain the failures of these attempted replications. First, Proffitt et al. (2006) 
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note that Hutchinson and Loomis’ (2006) use of three dependent variables for each trial is 
an important difference from the procedure of Proffitt et al. (2003), which used only 
verbal estimates. Part of the theory proposed in Witt et al. (2004) is that the impact 
energy has on perception is dependent on intention. That is, the environment and 
distances across it are seen in terms of the perceiver’s next anticipated action. If the next 
anticipated action is not to walk with a heavy backpack, but instead to provide another 
measure of the dependent variable unrelated to direct walking, it would not be predicted 
that difficulty walking with this weight would be a factor on distance estimates. 
 Secondly, Proffitt (2009) specifically questions the relevance of energy levels in 
the experimental design constructed by Durgin et al. (2009). The slant used in this study 
is 14.5°, constructed from a 1 x 2 m ramp, and presented to participants indoors. Proffitt 
(2009) argues that this setup is insufficient to produce a difference in energetic 
consequences. Wearing a backpack or not has little consequence if only expecting to 
walk a few feet. In contrast, the slant used in Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) was a real hill at 
31° and of significant length. The backpack manipulation is only meaningful if it would 
have an actual consequence on one’s ability to perform the particular behavior of interest 
while in the perceived environment. 
 Finally, Proffitt (2009) argues that experimental demands cannot fully explain the 
robustness and variety of contexts in which the effect of action capabilities on distance 
perception has been found. For example, the third experiment reported in Bhalla and 
Proffitt (1999) did not use an experimental manipulation: physical fitness was assessed 
independently and found to be negatively correlated with slant judgment. Similarly, Witt 
et al. (2008) found differences in distance judgments based on patient’s pre-existing 
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medical conditions. Moreover, Schnall, Zadra, and Proffitt (2010) have found that 
varying levels of blood glucose, the energetic resources of the body, produce expected 
differences in slant judgment. These results suggest that experimental demands fail to 
provide a comprehensive account of the sum of the findings derived from the economy of 
action theory. 
 Does this defense of the energetic economy’s role in spatial perception provide 
some explanation for the present experiment’s inability to find a significant difference 
between conditions? Most relevant is Proffitt et al.’s (2006) critique of Hutchinson and 
Loomis (2006), wherein participants’ actual anticipation of walking was called into 
question. Following Witt et al. (2004), he argues that distances are seen in terms of the 
very next intentional action expected to be performed. Though the goal of the present 
experiment was to make participants anticipate carrying, multiple trials of verbal 
estimates followed by blind-walking would likely have made this anticipated action much 
less salient and much less immediate. Thus, when participants perceived the target cone 
in front of them, the distance to it could be understood as being judged in terms of blind-
walking rather than solo or joint carrying. If this is true, finding no difference between 
the two groups would not be surprising. 
 Analyzing the first verbal trial in isolation was a post hoc attempt to address this 
concern by assessing the role of effort when carrying would have been most salient. 
Surprisingly, however, the results of this analysis show effects in the opposite direction 
from what a purely effortful account would predict. Expecting to receive help from 
someone judged to be strong led to larger distance estimates than those judging their 
partner to be weaker. Furthermore, the direction of the condition effect indicated that 
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expecting to carry jointly was itself predictive of larger estimates, not shorter ones. These 
results begin to suggest that social, coordinated action may involve additional, 
perceptually relevant factors beyond just physical effort that makes joint action 
qualitatively different from the experience of doing something alone. For example, being 
in the presence of another person is often enough to lead individuals to make automatic 
and unconscious social comparisons (Wood, 1996). Importantly, these judgments are 
most likely to be made with similar, readily comparable others (Festinger, 1954). Thus, 
expecting to work with another person on a task, as in the joint condition, will make such 
comparisons particularly relevant and meaningful. However, comparisons to those in 
one’s immediate context are quite capable of negatively impacting task performance, as 
in the case of stereotype threat (Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). For those judging 
their partner to be very strong, this comparison may have a deleterious effect on one’s 
own sense of strength and adequacy. Feeling weaker as a result of this contrast may 
actually produce a purely psychological effect similar to the direct effortful 
manipulations employed by Proffitt et al. (2003).  
 However, due to the present study’s design, the results found remain difficult to 
interpret. The actual salience of anticipated carrying relative to anticipated walking is 
unknown, even in this first trial. Therefore, isolating it from the rest of the experiment as 
the sole instance where carrying was top of mind for the participants may not be a fair 
assumption. It is certainly possible that, even in this first trial, participants were judging 
the task in terms of walking rather than joint or solo carrying. Moreover, ratings of the 
partner only took place after their completion of all five trials, and were therefore far 
removed from their first verbal estimate. Allotting predictive power to such post-
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experimental interpersonal perceptions must therefore be done with a great deal of 
caution.  
 In light of the methodological weaknesses of this first experiment, a second study 
was designed to address these concerns. The chief goal of the new design was to heighten 
the salience of the carrying manipulation so as to ensure that, while participants observed 
the target cone in front of them, the very next action they anticipated making would be 
carrying the box to it. To accomplish this, the procedure was changed in several ways. 
Rather than being told at the beginning of the experiment that they would make distance 
estimates to the targets on all trials and then carry the box to each location, participants 
were instructed that for each trial they would make a verbal estimate of distance and then 
immediately carry the box to it while blindfolded. By doing so, participants would no 
longer have any reason to anticipate walking to the target; rather, their only expected 
action in relation to the cone would be blind-carrying to it. Only after their blindfold was 
donned did the experimenter then tell the participants that they would first walk to the 
target.  
 Because of this change in procedure, it was deemed necessary to reduce the 
experiment to only a single trial. Though a lack of multiple trials risks increasing the 
noise resulting from individual variability, it was decided that the immediacy of 
anticipated carrying would be lost after this initial trial. The distance of 10 meters was 
chosen to be the single trial in this second study, for it was at this distance that verbal 
estimates and blind-walking distances were most strongly correlated (r = .61, p < .01) and 
also the distance where the largest differences between groups were observed for both 
measures.  
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Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-eight University of Connecticut undergraduate students (21 
male, 17 female) participated in the experiment. Participants were recruited as part of a 
requirement for their introductory course. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
and were without any physical impairment that would hinder their ability to lift objects. 
Apparatus and stimuli. The stimuli used in this experiment were identical to 
those used in Experiment 1. 
Design. Once again, participants were randomly assigned to either the solo-
carrying or the joint-carrying condition. As before, participants first provided a verbal 
estimate of distance and then subsequently blind-walked to the target. However, this 
experiment involved only a single trial. 
Procedure. As in Experiment 1, participants arrived at the gym and were met by 
a same-sex confederate acting as another participant. Those in the solo-carrying condition 
were told that they would be taking turns carrying a box to different locations on the tarp, 
while those in the joint-carrying condition were told that they would be working together.  
The participant and the confederate were weighed on a scale and informed that 
the object they would be carrying would be weighted proportionately. They were then 
each given duct-taped goggles to act as a blindfold. The experimenter told them that he 
wanted them to have practice walking with the goggles on before the experiment started. 
Those in the solo condition took turns walking to the end of the tarp and back with their 
goggles on. Those in the joint condition walked alongside the confederate. This addition 
to the procedure was done for two reasons. First, it was hoped that giving participants the 
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opportunity to walk the length of the tarp with their goggles on would give them a rough 
sense of their traveling distance while wearing them, thereby providing them with some 
practice blind-walking without actually including practice trials. Secondly, it was hoped 
that having joint carriers walk together would lead to a subtle increase in feelings of 
connectivity and group identity. After this practice walking, participants were given a 
questionnaire that asked them to rate the confederate in terms of strength, athleticism, 
likeability, similarity, and amount of interaction. While they did so, the experimenter 
weighted the box to a quarter of the participant’s weight. 
The participant was then brought to the convergence point on the tarp and asked 
to pick up the box while the confederate stood nearby. While turned, the experimenter 
placed an orange cone 10 m behind them (location D, center row on Fig. 1). The 
participant then turned and estimated how far they would be carrying to the cone. The 
participant was then instructed to place the box down in front of them. They were told 
that after they put their goggles on, the experimenter would go remove the cone, return, 
lift the box up to them, and they would try to carry the box to where the cone used to be 
with their goggles on. However, after the experimenter returned, he said “actually, before 
you carry the box [together], I would like you to try to walk to the cone first without the 
weight.” Once the participant stopped, their location was marked. Distance from the 
starting location to their stopping point was then measured. 
Results 
The means and standard errors for the key dependent measures of verbal and 
behavioral estimates of distance are shown in Figure 3. As in the first experiment, 
participants in both groups underestimated the actual distance of 10 meters on both 
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measures. The verbal estimates and blind-walking distances were significantly correlated, 
r = .46, p < .01. However, blind-walking distances were significantly larger than verbal 
estimates, t(37) = 3.16, p <.01. Additionally, blind-walking estimates were more 
accurate, as the absolute difference between the correct distance of 10 meters and the 
participants’ blind-walking estimate was significantly smaller than the absolute 
difference of their verbal estimates, t(37) = 5.62, p < .001. 
To test the hypothesis that expecting to carry a heavy object either with another 
person or alone would lead to differing judgments of distance, ANCOVAs were 
conducted on the verbal and blind-walking estimates. In light of the effect box weight 
had on distance estimates in the largest trial of Experiment 1, it was included in these 
analyses as a possible covariate. For the verbal estimate, the effect of condition was 
statistically significant, F(1, 35) = 5.10, p < .05, r = .36. Surprisingly, those in the joint 
carrying condition reported farther distances than did those expecting to carry alone, 
replicating the trend found in the first trial of Experiment 1. Box weight also had a 
statistically significant effect on verbal estimates, F(1, 35) = 10.63, p < .01, r = .48, with 
larger weights predictive of greater distance judgments. An additional analysis including 
the box weight by condition interaction revealed no violation of the homogeneity of 
regression assumption, F(1, 37) = 1.07, p = .31. For the measure of blind-walking, 
however, the effect of condition was nonsignificant, F(1, 35) = 1.71, p = .20, r = .22. Box 
weight, on the other hand, again had a statistically significant effect, F(1, 35) = 3.95, p = 
.05, r = .32. As with verbal estimates, larger box weight led to greater blind-walking 
distances. Again, an analysis including the box weight by condition interaction did not 
reveal a violation of the homogeneity of regression assumption, F(1, 37) < 1. 
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Perceptions of the confederate. As in Experiment 1, participants in the two 
conditions formed similar impressions about the confederate, all |t|s ≤ 1.16, ps > .26. 
Once again, the confederate was rated well above the midpoint in terms of strength (M = 
6.24, SD = .90), athleticism (M = 6.16, SD = 1.24), and being likable (M = 6.73, SD = 
1.19). Confederates were rated at about the midpoint for similarity (M = 4.76, SD = 1.53). 
However, participants in the joint carrying condition tended to say there was slightly 
more interaction between them and the confederate, t(35) = 1.75, p < .10, though amount 
of interaction was still viewed as relatively low (Joint: M = 3.83, SD = 2.26; Solo: M = 
2.63, SD = 1.92). Unlike Experiment 1, men and women rated their same-sex confederate 
differently in several key ways. Men rated the confederate higher in terms of strength, 
t(35) = 2.41, p < .05 (Women: M = 5.88, SD = .99; Men: M = 6.55, SD = .69), whereas 
women rated their confederate higher in terms of similarity, t(35) = 3.16, p < .01 
(Women: M = 5.53, SD = .26; Men: M = 4.10, SD = .36), and in being likable, t(35) = 
2.55, p < .05 (Women: M = 7.24, SD = .66; Men: M = 6.30, SD = 1.38). 
Consistent with Experiment 1, ratings of confederate strength and athleticism 
were highly correlated, r = .59, p < .001. Similarity ratings were correlated with amount 
of interaction, r = .48, p < .01, and liking, r = .51, p < .01. Liking and amount of 
interaction was also significantly correlated, r = .38, p < .05. No difference in the pattern 
of these correlations or pattern of gender differences was found between conditions. 
The relationship between perceptions of the confederate and the participants’ 
distance estimates were also examined between conditions to see if differences in 
judgments led to variations in verbal and blind-walking reports. These correlations are 
shown in Table 2. Importantly, unlike in the first experiment, these interpersonal ratings 
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were completed prior to the distance trial. As in Experiment 1, ratings of the confederate 
had no relationship with the distance measures among those in the solo carrying 
condition (|r|s ≤ .26, ps > .05). However, in the joint carrying condition, ratings of their 
partner’s athleticism were positively correlated with both their verbal estimate, r = .46, p 
= .05, and blind-walking, r = .47, p = .05. Additionally, ratings of partner strength were 
marginally correlated with the verbal estimate, r = .40, p < .10. Consistent with 
Experiment 1, more positive appraisals of the anticipated partner’s physical abilities 
surprisingly related to larger perceived distances. Notably, judgments of similarity, 
likability, and amount of interaction were all negatively correlated with distance 
estimates for those in the joint condition, though these were nonsignficant, rs ≥ -.31, ps > 
.21. 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 2, participants were told that they would be carrying a heavy box 
while blindfolded, either alone or jointly with a partner. Surprisingly, participants 
expecting help carrying gave larger verbal estimates of distance to the target than those 
expecting to carry alone. Blind-walking results did not significantly differ, though they 
showed a trend in the same direction as the verbal measure. Moreover, ratings of the 
confederate’s physical characteristics were positively correlated with distance estimates 
among those in the joint carrying condition, a finding consistent with the first trial of 
Experiment 1. 
 These results cannot be easily squared with a strict interpretation of Proffitt’s 
(2006b) theory of the economy of action, as it is unlikely that a purely physical account 
can explain the direction of the found effect. On the one hand, Naylor and Amazeen 
JOINT ACTION AND DISTANCE PERCEPTION  40 
 
 
 
(2004) have demonstrated that judgments of object heaviness can be greater when lifting 
with another individual than when lifting alone. They argue that this effect is due to 
additional physical forces present only when holding jointly. Specifically, there is an 
additional horizontal force resulting from pulling the object towards oneself, thus making 
the object feel more unwieldy. Nevertheless, it does not follow that joint carrying is 
therefore actually perceived to be a more difficult physical task than carrying alone. 
Estimating a weight to be heavier when holding it with another person is not equivalent 
to actually supporting more weight. For example, a participant may estimate a load to 
weigh 100 lbs when lifting alone, but estimate it to be 120 lbs when holding jointly. Even 
so, carrying this object with another his person would entail supporting what feels like 60 
lbs, whereas working alone would necessarily involve supporting what feels like 100 lbs. 
It is therefore unlikely that anticipating working with another person would actually 
result in expecting to expend more physical energy. 
Understanding the results of the present study in relation to past findings therefore 
requires broadening how one conceptualizes the role perception plays in guiding and 
constraining behavior. Rather than viewing effortful influences on distance judgments as 
a comprehensive account of non-optical related perceptual adaptation, Proffitt’s (2006b) 
findings can perhaps be better understood as just a single factor involved in perception’s 
role in facilitating action. Managing energetic output may be an important constraint on a 
perception-action system, but it is not the sole one. Rather, perception and action are 
guided by multiple, mutually constraining values, with energetic efficiency being only 
one of many factors (Hodges & Baron, 1992). Though anticipated physical exertion may 
be an important factor in certain contexts, in others it may play a lesser role relative to 
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other pressures for successful self-regulation. In this experiment, the participants’ 
anticipated activity was carrying a heavy weight across a gym while blindfolded. Though 
necessarily less physically taxing, carrying this heavy object with another person could 
be understood as more psychologically taxing than doing so alone. Relative to solo-
carrying, coordinating with another person without the aid of vision is a difficult task, not 
in terms of physicality, but in terms of the additional cognitive resources and social 
obligations inherent in being part of a cooperative unit. Ultimately, working with or 
without another person is not equivalent to working with or without a heavy backpack. 
Becoming part of a social unit, a new perception-action system, produces not only new 
environmental affordances, but also new challenges. This experiment provides initial 
evidence that such challenges, arising from social interaction, have perceptual 
consequences. 
 Several other research programs have found evidence for the role of visual 
perception in self-regulation, above and beyond just energy maintenance. For example, 
Stefanucci (2010) has argued that emotions are a type of bodily state directly impacting 
perception of spatial layout. Fear in particular appears to serve a clear self-regulatory 
purpose, and it has been shown to influence both height and slant judgments. In one 
study, observers were asked to stand on a skateboard at the top of a hill. Those reporting 
high levels of fear descending the hill estimated the slant of the hill to be greater than 
those who were unafraid (Stefanucci, Proffitt, Clore, & Parekh, 2008). Stefanucci and 
Proffitt (2009) found that participants’ judgments of height from the top of a banister 
were correlated with reported fear of heights. Stefanucci (2010) reports a study using a 
high ropes course. Height was overestimated more for students at the top of a platform 
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when they were about to rappel down than for those not about to jump, suggesting that 
fear may be a particularly relevant perceptual constraint when a dangerous behavior is 
available.  
Anxiety levels also impact perceivers’ ability to detect and utilize available 
environmental affordances. Pijpers, Oudejans, Bakker, and Beek (2006) found that 
judgments of maximal overhead reachability on a climbing wall were reduced by high 
levels of anxiety. Similarly, Jiang and Mark (1994) found that observers increasingly 
underestimate the crossability of a gap as the depth increases, suggesting that the 
consequences of falling may play a role in such judgments. These differences in spatial 
judgments highlight how one’s emotional state can regulate behavior through variations 
in perception. 
Past performance and success also appear to influence perceptual judgments. For 
example, Witt and Proffitt (2005) asked softball players to estimate the size of the ball 
after winning a game. Those who hit well remembered the ball as being larger than those 
who hit poorly. Similar results have been found for other sports: golfers putting well 
judge the size of the hole to be larger (Witt, Linkenauger, Bakdash, & Proffitt, 2008), 
field goal kickers view goal posts to be farther apart and closer to the ground after 
making successful kicks (Witt & Dorsch, 2009), and better dart players report the center 
target to be larger than poorer players (Canal-Bruland, Pijpers, & Oudejans, 2009; Wesp, 
Cichello, Gracia, & Davis, 2004). Thus, the ability of the perceiver to act successfully on 
an object affects how that object itself is perceived. 
 Moreover, Balcetis and Cole (2009) have argued that perception has a regulatory 
function tied to motivational processes. In this way, distance perception is influenced not 
JOINT ACTION AND DISTANCE PERCEPTION  43 
 
 
 
only by a drive to avoid dangerous actions, but also by a drive to pursue beneficial 
actions. Balcetis and Dunning (2010) report several experiments showing desirable 
objects to be judged closer than undesirable objects. For example, distance to a bottle of 
water was perceived to be closer for thirsty participants, and test results were judged to be 
closer for those believing it contained positive feedback. The motivation to reduce 
cognitive dissonance also appears capable of affecting perceptual judgments. Balcetis and 
Dunning (2007) found that participants asked to walk across campus wearing a Carmen 
Miranda costume judged the distance they traveled to be shorter when in a high-choice 
condition. That is, those who believed they had been given the choice to dress up as they 
did resolved the dissonance resulting from their behavior by judging their walk to be 
shorter. Similarly, in a second study the authors found that participants asked to push 
themselves up a hill on a skateboard reported shallower slants when in the high-choice 
condition. Thus, there is evidence that distance judgments are malleable in a number of 
ways, due to both motivational and environmental factors.  
 In much the same way, the results of the present study suggest that additional 
factors related to social interaction influence perceptions of distance above and beyond 
the physical costs necessary for completing a task. Carrying with another person requires 
less physical exertion than carrying alone, yet distances were reported as greater in this 
condition. How can this counterintuitive finding be explained? Joint-action entails 
becoming part of a dyadic synergy (Marsh et al., 2006), a unique perception-action 
system. Although this point was raised earlier to note that a dyadic synergy necessarily 
has its own available affordances and a distinct energetic economy, it is also important to 
acknowledge that this unit will necessarily have its own unique constraints on 
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cohesiveness and potential coordination. These constraints have two sources. First, the 
unit’s ability to successfully coordinate will necessarily depend on the nature of the task 
they are attempting to accomplish. The task of this experiment, carrying a heavy object 
with someone while blind-folded, clearly poses a challenge to cohesiveness. The 
direction and speed of the participant’s movement is dependent upon the partner, yet this 
coordination must take place without the aid of vision. Being unable to see one’s partner 
is a substantial limitation on the unit’s potential to effectively coordinate.  As a result, 
this task may very well be considered more difficult in the joint condition, for additional 
cognitive resources are clearly required. It would appear that this constraint on potential 
coordination was weighed more heavily by participants than any reduction in physical 
strain that would result from working with their partner.  
In addition to the task itself, the characteristics of one’s partner also act as a 
constraint on the ease with which coordination can be achieved. For example, Isenhower 
et al. (2010) found that people asked to move wooden planks attended to the arm length 
of their partner relative to their own when transitioning from solo to joint action. Thus, 
the pair’s ability to work together was dependent on the relevant, relative physical 
characteristics of the participant’s partner. In the present research, impressions of the 
confederate’s physical characteristics also appeared to be information participants 
attended to and were affected by. Surprisingly, however, both perceived athleticism and 
strength were positively correlated with distance estimates. Again, it seems that the 
purely physical support afforded by a partner is not necessarily the key element at play 
within social units. Instead, interactions can be costly. Working with another person 
entails an inherent obligation to be a good and valuable partner. If one’s partner appears 
JOINT ACTION AND DISTANCE PERCEPTION  45 
 
 
 
to be strong and athletic enough to be capable of handling the task alone, one’s value as 
both a partner and a participant is necessarily diminished. Attunement to this negative 
social information will naturally impact both the participant’s ability and desire to form a 
cohesive social unit, and it may ultimately lead to regulatory strategies meant to avoid 
such joint activity.  
The weight of the box was also found to significantly influence both verbal 
estimates and blind-walking distances. Though this was surprising, as it had meant to 
produce a controlled and equal sense of heaviness for all participants, the effect does 
indicate that physiological effort did in fact play some role in the outcomes of this 
experiment. Heavier weight lead to farther distance estimates. Nevertheless, there are 
several possible explanations for this effect. First, because the procedure included the 
experimenter weighting the box to the appropriate amount while in the presence of the 
participant, those being given a large amount would have been more likely to see the 
experimenter add weight, rather than remove it. Being more apt to observe this may have 
lead to experiencing the heaviness of the box differently. That is, watching the box be 
filled may lead to a greater expectation of weight, thereby producing a greater subjective 
experience of its heaviness. However, the experimenter adjusted the box while 
participants filled out their ratings of the confederate, so it is doubtful that much attention 
was actually being paid to the experimenter as he did this. Moreover, even if participants 
did notice the experimenter’s activities, evidence exists that calls into question the role of 
cognitive expectations on perceptions of heaviness (Masin & Crestoni, 1988). In fact, 
typical expectation models (Davis & Brickett, 1977) would actually predict the opposite 
effect: expecting the weight to be particularly heavy would lead participants to lift with 
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greater force, thereby overshooting the actual energy needed. This mismatch should make 
the box feel lighter upon lifting for those expecting greater weight. Finally, this 
explanation cannot account for the same effect found in the largest trial of Experiment 1, 
in which the box was weighted before the participant arrived. 
A second explanation for the effect of box weight is the possibility of a size-
weight illusion, produced by differing distributions of weight for heavier and lighter 
participants. According to Amazeen and Turvey’s (1996) Inertial Model, the perceived 
heaviness of an object is a function of its resistance to rotational forces. Though the 
dimensions of the box itself did not differ from participant to participant in this 
experiment, the distribution of the mass within the box did. All participants had a base 
weight of 25 lbs. at the bottom of their box. Additional weight, if needed, was then added 
after a second layer of insulation foam. Thus, a box used by the heavier participants 
would have had its weight distributed more equally on the vertical dimension than would 
the lighter participants. As a result, when controlling for actual weight, the box with more 
mass would actually be predicted to feel less heavy than the lighter box. The difference in 
weight distribution therefore fails to explain the direction of the effect found in this 
experiment. 
Another alternative explanation involves noting that, because the box was 
weighted to each participant, heavier participants were the people given larger amounts to 
carry. Due to their greater mass, heavier participants will necessarily expend more energy 
traversing any large distance than will smaller people. Thus, like the chronic pain patients 
studied in Witt et al. (2008), this difference could be understood as the product of 
individual, inherent physical characteristics relevant to energy expenditure. However, this 
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explanation is on theoretically weak footing. Even though larger participants must expend 
more energy, they should also have more energetic resources to draw from (e.g., muscle). 
One’s energetic economy is not based purely on raw energy requirements, but instead on 
the ratio between expended and available energy.  
The final and preferred explanation for the statistically significant effect found for 
box weight is the likelihood that basing the weight of the box purely on the participant’s 
weight produced an inequivalent experience of heaviness for some of the larger 
participants. Though very light participants would be largely similar in terms of strength, 
a person can weigh a lot due to either muscle or excess fat. Asking heavy, low-muscle-
mass participants to carry large amounts would necessarily require greater effort from 
them than would be needed for smaller participants carrying small amounts. Thus, 
without being able to adjust weight according to the participant’s BMI, heavier 
participants as a group were likely by and large presented with a physically more difficult 
task.  
The effect of condition was found for the verbal estimate, but the blind-walking 
measure did not significantly differ between conditions. It is worth considering then 
whether verbal estimates are a valid measure of distance perception. Verbal measures 
have been criticized previously, with some suggesting that, relative to blind-walking, it 
measures cognitive rather than perceptual judgments (e.g., Hutchinson & Loomis, 2006). 
That is, verbal reports are more the product of post-perceptual biases, such as 
experimental demands, whereas blind-walking is a purer gauge of actual visual processes. 
In the present research, participants’ blind-walking distances were indeed found to be 
significantly more accurate than their verbal estimates. However, there are reasons to 
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think that the verbal estimates used here are in fact valid criteria. First, in both 
experiments verbal estimates and blind-walking were significantly correlated with one 
another. This is consistent with prior comparisons between the two measures (Philbeck & 
Loomis, 1997), and previous work has found manipulations of effort that do affect both 
action-based and non-action-based distance judgments (e.g., Witt et al., 2005). This 
relationship suggests that there is at least some shared commonality between the two 
measures. Secondly, there is not a clear theoretical reason to think that blind-walking taps 
into actual visual processes better than verbal estimates. It is, after all, a measure of 
vision that is done without vision. As Proffitt et al. (2006) argue, “Only through 
convoluted argument could it be asserted that a measure obtained without vision is a 
“purer” measure of visual perception than one in which vision is unfettered” (p. 342). 
Importantly, blind-walking is a dynamic activity done over time that produces both haptic 
(feeling the floor and air) and auditory information (hearing one’s footsteps) in addition 
to the original visual information. As a result, blind-walking is just as likely to be at least 
partially guided by non-visual processes as are verbal estimates. Therefore, though blind-
walking was less impacted by the manipulations used here, this does not negate the claim 
that it was perceptual processes that were influenced by anticipated joint-action, not 
merely post-perceptual response biases. 
Rather than being an altogether different psychological process, the difference 
between the findings for verbal estimates and those for blind-walking distances may be 
the result of the distinct methodology used in this experiment. Verbal estimates were 
made by participants while actually holding the box. Blind-walking, on the other hand, 
was done after observing the target location while the box rested on the ground between 
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the participant and the confederate. This may be a key phenomenological difference. 
Receiving assistance from the confederate while giving the verbal measure would entail a 
shift from a solo-holding position to a joint carrying position. Therefore, joint-carrying at 
the point of the verbal estimate would necessarily involve a transition that may make 
coordination especially challenging. In contrast, when preparing to blind-carry, the 
experimenter told the participant that he would lift the box up to the two partners and 
each would take a side. Thus, no solo to joint holding transition is necessary at this stage. 
Prior research has found that humans’ ability to measure distance through their 
locomotion is dependent on maintaining gait symmetry (Turvey et al., 2009). That is, 
asymmetric transitions from a primary gait (e.g. walking) to a secondary gait (e.g., 
galloping) reduces individuals’ ability to accurately reproduce traveling distance. The 
anticipated transition from solo- to joint-carrying at the time of the verbal estimate may 
entail a similar process that adds an additional challenge to participants. Thus, if the 
effect found for condition in this experiment is in fact due to the challenges involved in 
coordinating, it seems possible that the different results found for the dependent variables 
is because such challenges would have been most pronounced at the time of the verbal 
estimate. 
General Discussion 
Two experiments tested the prediction that anticipating help from another person 
when carrying a heavy object would lead to shorter distance judgments relative to those 
expecting to carry alone. Based on Proffitt’s (2006b) theory of the economy of action, it 
was expected that the lessened physical strain resulting from having a partner would 
reduce anticipated carrying distances. Nevertheless, the opposite effect was found, with 
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reductions in the carrying task’s apparent physical difficulty instead increasing distance 
judgments, both between and within conditions. In Experiment 1, verbal estimates of the 
first trial were influenced by perceptions of the partner’s strength when participants 
expected to work with this person. However, these distance judgments actually increased 
when their partner was judged to be stronger. Moreover, expecting to carry jointly was 
itself predictive of larger verbal estimates. In Experiment 2, these effects were replicated, 
with participants’ verbal estimates significantly shorter in the joint-carrying condition and 
ratings of confederate’s physical traits positively correlated with perceived distance. 
These results suggest that alterations in physical strain alone do not predict changes in 
spatial perception in the context of joint action. Rather, it is argued that working as part 
of a social unit produces not just changes in terms of the individual’s effortful 
requirements, but also unique interpersonal challenges, expectations, and obligations. As 
a means of facilitating behavior in one’s environment, visual perception is sensitive to the 
new factors that arise from taking part in interpersonal coordination and joint action. 
Importantly, in certain contexts, it seems that these challenges can be more relevant and 
have greater influence on spatial perception than physical effort alone.  
 Because the results were contrary to the experimenter’s original hypothesis, it is 
important for future research to clarify that the observed results are in fact the result of 
perceived task difficulty. Coordinating with another person to carry a heavy object while 
blindfolded is a difficult enterprise, and it seems as though this challenge is the basis for 
the larger distance judgments when in the joint carrying condition. Therefore, 
manipulating the degree to which the task is judged to be difficult would likely be the 
most fruitful means of validating this explanation. Doing so can be done two ways. First, 
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the constraints on the unit’s ability to coordinate resulting from the task itself can be 
manipulated. This would entail altering the task so as to make the joint condition 
significantly easier in all respects, rather than just in terms of physical effort, as in the 
experiments above. For example, varying the length of the object to be carried may make 
the value of working with another person more or less apparent. If expecting to have to 
work another person, distance estimates should be inversely related with the degree to 
which that person needs the other to move the object comfortably. 
 The alternative approach would instead involve altering the constraints on the 
pair’s ability to coordinate that result from the participant’s perceptions of and 
relationship with the partner. This would entail manipulating the perception of 
interpersonal effort required for the task by either strengthening the sense of cohesiveness 
within the dyad, or by altering the valence of the participant’s attitude towards the other 
person. As Marsh et al. (2006) have suggested, individuals acting together are a synergy. 
The nature of this social synergy (along with its behavioral potential) is dependent upon 
their sense of connectedness, or entitativity (Campbell, 1958). High degrees of 
connectedness would have behavioral consequences for the synergy, such as “high 
awareness of the other’s movements, easy anticipation, and responsiveness to the other, 
much as teammates on a well honed basketball team can show immediate awareness of 
the motions of teammates” (Marsh et al., 2006, p. 25). It seems reasonable to predict that 
greater entitativity will also have an impact on anticipated physical and psychological 
effort, as participants should be able to accurately detect the synergy of their social unit.  
In support of this hypothesis, Schnall, Harber, Stefanucci, and Proffitt (2008) 
found that judgments of hill slant were reduced when participants were accompanied by a 
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friend, an effect that was mediated by relationship quality (i.e., duration, closeness, and 
warmth). They hypothesize that psychosocial resources such as social support are able to 
reduce one’s sense of physiological load. However, while their study speaks to how 
perceived sense of effort in solo action can be influenced by social factors, it does not 
address the dynamics of taking part in a task with another person. It would be in this 
context that one’s sense of entitativity should have the strongest impact. Such 
manipulations could include giving the participant a personality test which will imply 
similarity with their partner, or by manipulating confederate behavior so as to create a 
rude or disagreeable partner persona. It would be hypothesized that the greater the degree 
of entitativity experienced by the participant towards his or her dyadic unit, the lesser the 
anticipated effort of a joint-task will be. As a result, distance targets they expect to carry 
an object to with this partner would be predicted to be perceived as shorter. 
The results of the current research and the proposed new hypotheses highlight the 
complicating and often counterintuitive social factors that ultimately guide and influence 
all aspects of human activity, including perception. Recently, there have been calls for 
ecological researchers to take more seriously the role human sociality plays as a 
component of our basic perception-action cycles (e.g., Hodges & Baron, 2007). At the 
same time, there has been a renewed push for social psychologists to better grapple with 
the consequences of ecological theory in their understanding of social perception (e.g., 
Baron, 2010; Good, 2007). The main aim of this research program has been to provide 
several small steps towards just such integration.  
 For ecological researchers, these findings should spur on further thought in two 
ways. First, they emphasize the need to move beyond studying affordances simply in 
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terms of human-object interaction. Instead, more focus should be given to the 
possibilities for action within an environment as a whole, as can be found by adopting a 
theory of behavior settings (Heft, 2001). Distances, the space for movement within a 
medium, can and should be understood and defined in terms of the action possibilities for 
the perceiver. Although there has been a tradition within ecological psychology of 
understanding object perception as inherently involving the detection of affordances, 
distance perception has often been described simply in terms of detecting law-governed, 
invariant information. By emphasizing the accuracy of distance perception (which is, in 
fact, supported by the results of these experiments), what is lost is an appreciation for 
how behavioral opportunities and intention also guide these judgments of whole 
environments. 
Secondly, these experiments emphasize the need for ecological researchers to 
better understand the unique perceptual consequences resulting from being within a 
dyadic system. Traditionally, how affordances are perceived and actualized has been 
described almost exclusively with reference to individual body scaling. For example, 
whether a surface affords sitting is determined by the perceiver’s relevant body 
dimension (e.g., leg length) relative to the object (e.g., surface height). This is, however, 
an impoverished account of how people actually look and act in their environments. As 
Heft (1989) pointed out over two decades ago, affordances are indentified only when they 
are a means of expressing the perceiver’s goals and intentions. People are always doing 
and planning to do something, and these behavioral intentions are the units by which the 
world is seen, not universally applied body-object ratios. Acknowledging that the 
detection of affordances necessarily involves intention, an ecological account of 
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perception must address the unique goals, consequences, and constraints of social 
behavior. As has been shown, being asked to share half the load of a heavy object by 
carrying with another person is not equivalent to a single person being asked to carry half 
the original weight alone. Social coordination has unique challenges, not just in terms of 
overall task difficulty, but also in terms of other types of social psychological phenomena 
worth investigating (e.g., self-presentation, social loafing, social facilitation). These 
phenomena impact the intentions and motivations of a perceiver. Therefore, an ecological 
approach to perception that seeks to account for how one actively perceives the 
environment in terms of behavioral possibilities must seriously grapple with the social 
factors that either guide or constrain the intentions of perceivers. 
 Similarly, for social psychologists, it is hoped that this line of research will help to 
broaden current conceptions of what social perception actually entails. Historically, social 
psychologists have largely limited their study of perception to the question of how people 
form impressions about others. Even ecological forays into the field of social psychology 
have been chiefly interested in just this question (e.g., McArthur & Baron, 1983; 
Zebrowitz, 2006). However, this is too narrow a focus to fully address the important 
intersection between social phenomena and perceptual processes. All perception is social. 
The environments in which we live and act are socially constructed, being the product of 
cultural and historical development (Heft, 2007). Goals and intentions are the result of 
not only individual agency, but local and chronic social norms, customs, and obligations. 
Thus, how one relates to even inanimate objects (i.e., how we detect affordances) is 
necessarily saturated with both the perceiver’s and the larger society’s social history. 
Moreover, the experiments described here have sought to show how even spatial 
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perception, a process that seems among the most basic and objective we perform, is 
socially influenced. Working with someone has ramifications for how the world itself is 
seen. These findings highlight the importance of social relationships on one of the most 
basic of human processes: Being embedded in a functional social unit alters one's 
perception of his or her immediate surroundings. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
 
Average Estimates of Distances for Solo and Joint Conditions, Experiment 1 
 
    Distances 
Estimates 
  
4 m 6 m 8 m 10 m 12 m Range of r'sa 
     Verbal 
     
   Solo 2.97 5.32 7.68 10.89 13.40 .97 - 1.00 
 
(0.55) (0.82) (1.32) (1.71) (3.00) 
      
   Joint 3.13 5.21 7.82 9.86 13.02 .93 - 1.00 
 
(0.34) (0.92) (1.74) (1.34) (1.92) 
    
     
Blind-Walking 
     
   Solo 3.44 5.20 7.42 9.42 11.01 .94 - 1.00 
 
(0.32) (0.65) (0.76) (1.00) (2.10) 
      
   Joint 3.70 5.40 7.18 8.90 11.47 .91 - 1.00 
 
(0.45) (0.65) (1.15) (1.07) (1.60) 
    
r's between DVs 
 
.15 .16 .49* .61* .47* 
 
Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 
aRanges reflect the correlations between actual distances and estimates across the five 
distances within participants.  
*p < .01.  
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Table 2 
Prediction of Centered Distance Estimates in Experiment 1  
   
  
b Std. Error t p 
Fixed Effects 
 
    
Block 1: Intercept -.34 .18 -1.92 .06 
 Estimate Type 
  .31 .08  3.71  ** 
 Condition -.07 .24   -.31 .76 
 Box Weight 
  .03 .02   1.38 .18 
 Trial Distance 1.02 .02 41.14  ** 
  
    
Block 2: Estimate Type x Condition -1.54 .17  -.92 .37 
 Estimate Type x Box Weight 
  .01 .01   .80 .43 
 Estimate Type x Trial Distance 
  .16 .02  9.68  ** 
 Condition x Box Weight 
 -.06 .04 -1.37 .18 
 Condition x Trial Distance 
 -.05 .05 -1.09 .28 
 Box Weight x Trial Distance 
  .02 .01  3.71 ** 
  
    
Block 3: Estimate Type x Condition x 
Box Weight  
 -.04 .03 -1.17 .25 
 Estimate Type x Condition x 
Trial Distance 
 -.05 .03 -1.40 .16 
 Estimate Type x Box Weight x 
Trial Distance 
  .00 .00    .51 .61 
 Condition x Box Weight x 
Trial Distance 
 -.01 .01 -1.45 .15 
      
Block 4: Estimate Type x Condition x 
Box Weight x Trial Distance 
 -.01 .01 -2.33 .02 
  
    
  
b Std. Error 
Wald 
Z p 
Repeated Measures Verbal Estimate  .79 .10 8.00 ** 
 Blind-Walking Distance 1.54 .19 8.00 ** 
 
Random Effects 
     
Verbal Estimate .61 .24 2.50 .01 
Blind-Walking Distance .38 .14 2.67 .01 
 
     
 
Note. Dependent variable is distance estimate centered on 8 m. 
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Table 3 
 
Correlations and Partial Correlations Between Confederate Ratings and Distance 
Estimates 
  Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Verbal Estimate Verbal Estimate Blind-Walking 
Solo 
Carriers 
Joint 
Carriers 
Solo 
Carriers 
Joint 
Carriers 
Solo 
Carriers 
Joint 
Carriers 
Athleticism -.36 .15 -.06 .46* .04    .47* 
Strength .18    .62** .26 .40* -.02 .34 
Amount of 
Interaction .08  .31  .12  -.17  .19  -.05 
Likable -.23 .33 -.05 -.17 -.04 -.02 
Similarity .33 .19 .10 -.31 .22 -.08 
 
Note. Values shown for Experiment 1 are partial correlations for the first trial, controlling 
for actual distance. Zero order correlations are shown for Experiment 2. 
*p < .10, **p < .05.  
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Table 4 
Prediction of Verbal Estimates of Distance in Experiment 1 for First Trial 
  
  
b Std. Error β t p 
Model 1 Intercept -1.37 0.48 
 
-2.84 .01 
 
Actual Distance 1.10 0.06 0.96 18.40 ** 
 
Model 2 Intercept -1.45 0.46 
 
-3.19 ** 
Actual Distance 1.08 0.06 0.94 18.50 ** 
Condition 0.42 0.33 0.07 1.30 .20 
Perceived Strength 0.34 0.15 0.12 2.33 .03 
 
Model 3 Intercept -1.11 0.46 
 
-2.42 .02 
Actual Distance 1.05 0.06 0.91 18.23 ** 
Condition 0.45 0.31 0.07 1.46 .16 
Perceived Strength 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.01 .99 
Condition x Perceived Strength 0.62 0.29 0.16 2.15 .04 
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Bird’s-eye view of the target space in Experiment 1. Stimuli were positioned 
four meters (A), six meters (B), eight meters (C), ten meters (D), and twelve meters (E) 
from the observer along the five radial directions. 
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Figure 2. Simple slopes for perception of confederate strength on verbal estimate of 
participants’ first trial, Experiment 1.
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Figure 3. Distance estimates, Experiment 2. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Verbal Estimate Blind-Walking Distance
Solo Carrying
Joint Carrying
P
e
rc
e
iv
e
d
 D
is
ta
n
ce
 in
 M
e
te
rs
JOINT ACTION AND DISTANCE PERCEPTION  78 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Current age (please be accurate)  ______________ 
 
 
Indicate your gender:   Male  Female 
 
Indicate your ethnicity background (Circle all that apply): 
White 
American 
African-
American 
Hispanic-
American 
Asian-
American 
Native 
American 
Other 
 
 
Below are a number of questions that relate to the experiment you are about to 
participate in. Please circle a number for each statement.  
 
1.  How would you characterize the other student in terms of their strength? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Extremely weak Extremely strong 
 
 
2.  How would you characterize the other student in terms of their athleticism? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Extremely unathletic Extremely athletic 
 
 
3. How likable do you find the other student? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Extremely unlikable Extremely likable 
 
 
4. How much interaction was there between you and the other student? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Not much interaction at all 
 
  
 
Lots of interaction 
5.  How similar to yourself do you find the other student to be? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Extremely dissimilar Extremely similar 
 
